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SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF DUTCHESS
In the Matter of the Application of
RICHARD REYES , #92-A-3672
DECISION, ORDER and
JUDGMENT

Petitioner,

Index No . 1674/2017

-againstTINA M. STANFORD, Chair of the
NEW YORK STATE BOARD OF PAR OLE,
Respondent.

HON. PETER M. FORMAN, Acting Supreme Court Justice
The following papers were read and considered in deciding this petition:
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This Article 78 proceeding challenges a decision of the New York State Di vision of
Parole (the "Board") denying Petitioner's second application for release to parole supervision.
For the reasons stated herein, the Petition is denied.

BACKGROUND
On February 20, 1992, Petitioner was convicted after jury trial of Murder in the Second
Degree, Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Second Degree, Attempted Robbery in the First
1

Degree, and Attempted Robbery in the Second Degree. This conviction arose from the botched
robbery of an auto repair shop in Queens. During the course of that attempted robbery,
Petitioner's accomp lice shot and ki lled the store owner.
On April 16, 1992, Petitioner was sentenced to a period of imprisonment of 25 years to
life on the murder conviction. Defendant was also sentenced to a concunent period of
imprisomnent of 7 Y2 years to 15 years on the Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Second

Degiee and Attempted Robbery in the F irst Degree convictions. Finally, Defendant was
sentenced to a concunent period of imprisoru11ent of 3 Yi years to 7 years on the Attempted
Robbery in the Second Degree conviction. That conviction was sub sequently affim1ed . [People v.
Reyes, 204 AD2d 36 1 (2d Dept. 1994), app. denied 83 NY2d 971 (1994) ].
Petitioner's second application for release to parole supervision was heard by the Board
on February 14, 2017 . During that interview, the Board considered the circumstances and
severity of Petitioner's crime. Although Petitioner was not the shooter in this felony murder case,
Petitioner accepted full responsibility for his actions during the parole interview.
The Board also considered Petitioner's prior criminal history as a j uveni le offender,
which included three fe lony robbery anests that were prosecuted in Kings County Fami ly Court.
The Board also considered Petitioner's prior criminal history as an adult. Although Petitioner
was only 18 years old when he pa1iicipated in the murder for which he is currently imprisoned,
his prior criminal history as an adult already included an Attempted Robbery in the Second
Degree conviction, and misdemeanor assault and drug convictions .
The Board also considered Petitioner's institutional record, including his disciplinary
infractions, his program accomplishments, and his release plan. With respect to his discipl in ary
history, the Board noted that Petitioner had an extensive history of disciplinary infractions during
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his first 17 years in prison, including 28 Tier II infractionsr and 16 Tier III infractions. However,
the Board also noted that Petitioner's disciplinary history has greatly improved in the last ten
years , that his last violent conduct infraction was committed in 2006, that his last Tier III
infraction was committed in 2009 , and that he has not been charged with any infractions over the
last eight years. The Board provided Petitioner with the opportunity to discuss his effo rts at
achieving personal growth during his time in prison, and to explain ho w those effo1is contributed
to his improved discip linary history.
The Board spent considerable time speaking with Petitioner about hi s program
accomp li shments, with particular emphasis on the significant positive influences and benefits
that Petitioner realized through his pa1iicipation in the Merrill Cooper and Rising Hope
programs. The Board also discussed Petitioner's work as an inmate mobility assistant for the
sensorially disabled , his academic achievements, hi s work in prison ministry and hum an services,
and his participation in substance abuse treatment programs.
The Board also reviewed and considered the COMP AS risks and needs assessment that
had been prepared as required by the Exec utive Law. The Board noted that Petitioner scored a 5
out of 10 for risk of felony vio lence, but that he was also scored as a low arrest ri sk and a low
abscond iisk. The Board also noted that Petitioner's history of vio lence was high, and that reentry substance abuse was deemed highly probable.
The Board also reviewed Petitioner's release plan, including the job that he had lined up
as a car service dispatcher, and his plan to reside with his wife. The Board also reviewed letters
of support that Petitioner has received from fami ly members, political leaders, and program
instructors. The Board also reviewed letters that it has received from the District Attorney's
Office that prosecuted him, and the defense attorney who represented him at tri al.
3

Near the end of the parole interview, th ~ Board provided Petitioner w ith the opportunity
to provide any additional infonnation that he might want to share in connection with his
application for release to parole supervision. After listening to Petitioner's personal statement,
the Board thanked Petitioner, and aclrnow ledged that Petitioner had "given us a lot to think
about. " Finally, the Board promised that it would make a decision based upon the statutory
criteria, and b ased upon all of the information that Petitioner had provided during the hearing.
The Board ultimately denied Petitioner's application for release to paro le s upervision .
Specifically, the Board acknowledged that Petitioner had made significant efforts toward
rehabilitation, including his participation in the Men-ill Cooper and Rising Hope programs and
his work as a mobility assistant. The Board also noted Petitioner's improved disciplinary hi story,
and his official and community letters of support. The Board also reviewed the facts underlying
P etitioner 's conviction, his sentencing minutes, his prior criminal history, and a letter of
opposition that had been submitted by the Queens Co unty District Attorney's Office.
Whil e the Board commended Petitioner's personal growth and productive use of time, the
Board also recognized that an inmate do es not automatically qualify for release on parole as a
reward for good conduct. In denying Petitioner 's second application for release to parole
supervision, the Board stated:
After deliberating, reviewing your overall record and weighing the statutory
factors discretionary release is not presently warranted as yo ur release wou ld
trivialize the tragic loss of life that you caused and furthermore would be
incompatible with the welfare of society and w ould so deprecate the serious
nature of yam crimes as to undermine respect for the law.
On April 25, 2017 , Petitioner perfected his administrative appeal from that denial. On
June 26, 2017 , the Appeals Unit denied Petitioner's appeal. This Artic le 78 proceeding ensued.
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DISCUSSION
"A paro le determination may be set aside only when the determination to deny the
petitioner release on parole evinced 'irrationality bordering on impropriety.' " [Matter of
Goldberg v.

ew York State Board of Parole, 103 AD3d 634, 634 (2d Dept. 2013) quoting

Matter of Martinez v. New York State Division of Paro le. 73 AD3d 1067, 1067 (2d Dept . 20 10).

See also Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 NY2d 470, 476 (2000); Matter of Russo v. New York
State Bd. of Parole. 50 NY2d 69, 77 (1980)]."The burden is on the petitioner to make a
convincing demonstration of entitlement to such relief." [Matter of Duffy v. New York State
Division of Parole, 74 AD3d 965, 966 (2d Dept. 20 10). See also Matter of Goldberg v. New
York State Board of Parole, 103 AD3d 634, 635 (2d Dept. 20 13); Matter of Midgette v. New
York State Division of Parole, 70 AD3d 1039, 1040 (2d Dept. 2010)].
There is no merit to Petitioner's claims that the Board improperly denied his application
based solely on the facts underlying his conviction, and that the Board failed to properly consider
the COMP AS risk and needs assessment. Pursuant to Executive Law § 259- i(2)( c), the Board " is
required to consider a number of statutory factors in detennining whether an inmate should be
released on parole." [Matter of Goldberg v. New York State Board of Parole, 103 AD3d 634, 634
(2d Dept. 2013), quoting Matter of Gelsomino v. New York State Board of Parole. 82 AD3d
1097, 1098 (2d Dept. 2011)]. "The Parole Board is not required to give eq ual we ight to each
statutory factor, and it is not required to 'aiiiculate specifically each factor in its
determination. "'[Matter of Stanley v. New York State Div. of Parole, 92 AD3d 948, 948 (2d
Dept. 2012) , quoting Matter of Huntley v. Evans. 77 AD3d 945, 947 (2d Dept. 2010). See also
Matter of Thomches v. Evans, 108 AD3d 724, 724 (2d Dept. 2013); Matter of Angel v. Travis, 1
AD3d 859, 860 (3d Dept. 2003) ("It should be noted that although the Board articulated the most
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compelling factors influencing its decision, it was under no obligation to discuss every factor it
considered"]. "Notably, parole need not be granted as a reward for good conduct, nor as a quid
pro quo for participation in reconunended DOCS programs." [P eople ex rel. Gennenis v.
Cunningham, 73 AD3d 1297, 1298 (3d Dept. 2010). See also Matter of Mentor v. New York
State Division of Parole, 87 AD3d 1245, 1246 (3d Dept. 2014); Matter of Gutkaiss v. New York
State Division of Parole, 50 AD3d 1418, 1418 (3d Dept. 2008)].
The Board is also "entitl ed to place greater emphasis on the seriou s nature of the crim es
over the other factors" [Matter of Vigliotti v. State Executive Division of Parole, 98 AD3d 789,
790-91 (3d Dept. 2012)], including the violent nature of that crime. [Matter of Angel v. Travis,
supra at 860, quoting Matter of Lue-Shing v. Pataki, 301AD2d827, 828 (3d Dept. 2003) . See

also Matter of Patterson v. Evans, 106 AD3d 1456 (4th Dept., May 3, 2013); Matter of
MacKenzie v. Evans, 95 AD3d 1613, 1614 (3d Dept. 2012)]. It is also within the Board 's
discretion to conclude that the severity of an imnate's offense outweighs an imnate's positive
institutional record and his letters of support. [Matter of Cardenales v. Dennison, 37 AD3d 371,
371 (1st Dept. 2007) (denial of application for release to parole supervision was not arbitrary and
capricious, even though the petitioner had an exemplary institutional record and had received
many letters of support, including a letter of support from the victim's mother). See also Matter
of Anthony v. New York State Division of Parole, 17 AD3d 301, 301 (1st Dept. 2005); Matter
of Kirkpatrick v. Travis, 5 AD3d 385, 385-86 (2d Dept. 2004)].
Here, the Board properly considered and reviewed the circumstances and severity of
Petitioner' s crimes, his institutional record, his program accomplislunents, his release plan, and
his letters of support and opposition. Contrary to Petitioner's assertions, the Board also properly
incorporated the COMP AS risk and needs assessment in its determination as required by
6

Executive Law §259-c(4) and §259-i(2)(c)(A). Although the COMPAS assigned Petitioner low
arrest and abscond risk scores, it also assigned a high probability to the risk of substance abuse.
[Matter of Wade v. Stanford, 148 AD3d 1487, 1488 (3d Dept. 20 17)]. ln any event, Petitioner's
COMP AS scores are not dispositive. [see Matter of Dawes v. Annucci, 122 AD3d 1059, 1060-61
(3d Dept. 2014) ("Although petitioner's COMPAS Risk and Needs Assessment Instrument
indicated that he was at a low risk for violence, rean-est and absconding, the COMP AS
instrument is only one fac tor that the Board is req uired to consider"). See also Matter of Rivers v.
Evans, 119 AD3d 1188 (3d Dept. 2014); Matter of Rivera v. New York State Division of Parole,
119 AD3d 1107 (3d Dept. 20 14); Matter of Williams v. New York State Division of Parole, 114
AD3d 992 (3d Dept. 2014)].
Petitioner also asse1is that the Board improperly considered community opposition to his
application for release to parole supervision. As a preliminary matter, the Court concludes that
community opposition is an appropriate factor that the Board may take into consideration when
reviewing an application for discretionary release to paro le supervision. [9 NYCRRs8000.5(c)(2)
("it is essential... to permit private citizens to express freely their opinions for or against an
individual's parole). See also Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(B) ("Where a crime victim .. . or other
person submits to the parole board a written statement concerning the release of an inmate, the
parole board shall keep that individual's name and address confidential")].
In any event, although the decision denying Petitioner's application states that the Board
considered "official and conununity opposition as well as official support," an in camera review
reveals that the Board only received letters of community suppo1i, and not of community
opposition. To the extent that the Board mistakenly indicated otherwise when it announced its
decision, there is no basis to conclude that this misstatement affected the Board 's decision in a
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meaningful way. [Matter of Mercado v. Evans, 120 AD3d 1521 (3d Dept . 20 14); Matter of Sin gh
v. Evans, 107 AD3d 1274, 1275 (3d Dept. 2013)]. The Court also finds that the letter of official
opposition that was received from the Queens County District Attorney's Office was properly
considered by the Board [Matter of Grigger v. New York State Division of Parole, 11 AD3d 850,
853 (3d Dept. 2004)).
U ltimately, "whether the Board considered the proper factors and followed the proper
guidelines are questions that should be assessed based upon the 'written determination evaluated
in the context of the parole hearing transcript.'" [Matter of Jackson v. Evans, 118 AD3d 70 1 (2d
Dept. 20 14), quoting Matter of Siao-Pao v. D ennison, 11 NY3 d 777, 778 (2008). See also Matter
of Fraser v. Evans, 109 AD3d 70 1 (2d D ept. 2013); Matter of Galbreith v. New York State
Division of Parole, 58 A.D.3d 731 (2d Dept. 2009)]. In the context of that transcript, there is no
merit to Petitioner's claim that the Board failed to provide a sufficient explanation of the reasons
supporting its determination [Id. at 702. See also Matter of Fraser v. Evans, 109 AD3d 701 (2d
Dept. 2013); Matter of Galbreith v. New York State Division of Parole, 58 AD3d 73 1 (2d Dept.
2009)].
Therefore, under the relevant standard of review, the Board's denial of Petitioner's second
application for release from confinement was neither arb itrary nor capricious, and the Board did
not act as a sentencing judge when it denied that application [Matter ofLeGeros v. New York
State Board of Paro le, 139 AD3d 1068 (2d Dept. 2016); Matter of Ramos v. Heath, 106 AD3d
747 (2d Dept. 2013); Matter of Davis v. Evans, 105 AD3d 1305 (20 13); Matter of Rodriguez v.
Evans, 102 AD3d 1049, 1050 (3d Dept. 2013)]. There is also no evidence that the Board's
detennination was i1ntional to the point of bordering on impropriety. [Matter of Cruz v. New
York State Division of Parole, 39 AD3d 1060, 1062 (3d Dept. 2007) (stating that while the co urt
8

found the petitioner's "academic and institutional achievements exemp lary," and that the court
considered the petitioner to be "a prime candidate for parole release," the Board's decision to deny
parole would be upheld because it did not exhibit "irrationality bordering on impropriety"). See

also Matter ofThomches v. Evans, 108 AD3d 724, 724-25 (3d Dept. 2013); Matter of Rivera v.
New York State Division of Parole, 95 AD3d 1586, 1587 (3d Depl. 2012); Matter of Murray v.
Evans, 83 AD3d 1320, 1321 (3d Dept. 2011)).
Finally, there is no merit to Petitioner's claim that his procedural and substantive due
process rights were viulalt:u [Malttr ofFrttman v. Ntw York Stale Division of Parole, 21 AD3d
1174 (3d Dept. 2005)]. Because Petitioner's remaining contentions are also without merit, it is
hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Verified Petition is denied, and that
this Article 78 proceeding is dismissed.
The foregoing constitutes the Decision, Order and Judgment of this Court.
Dated: Poughkeepsie, NY
September 21, 20 l 7

PETER M. FORMAN
ACTING SUPREME COURT JUSTICE
TO:

Kathy Manley, Esq.
Attorney for Petitioner
74 Chapel Street
Albany, New York 12207
Jeane L. Strickland Smith, Esq.
New York State Attorney General's Office
One Civic Center Plaza
Suite 401
Poughkeepsie, NY 12601
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